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Bell v. Industrial Vangas: The Employer-Manufacturer
and the Dilemma of Dual Capacity
The California workers' compensation system' has recently be-
come the subject of attack in the form of exceptions2 to its rule of exclu-
sive remedy.3 These exceptions are based upon strong social policies
that are extrinsic to the workers' compensation system itself.4 The Cal-
l. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982). The workers' compensa-
tion scheme in California is authorized by the California Constitution, which provides in
part: "The Legislature is hereby expressly vested with plenary power, unlimited by any
provision of this Constitution, to create, and enforce a complete system of workers' compen-
sation, by appropriate legislation, and in that behalf to create and enforce a liability on the
part of any and all persons to compensate any or all of their workers for injury or disability,
and their dependents for death incurred or sustained by the said workers in the course of
their employment, irrespective of the fault of any party .. " CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4
(added June 8, 1976).
Workers' compensation in California requires an employer other than the state either to
secure insurance against employee injuries from an approved carrier, or be authorized to
self-insure. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3700 (West Supp. 1982). Insurance benefits are in turn paid
to injured employees when their injuries are sustained "in the course of employment" and
are "proximately caused by the employment." Id § 3600. As noted by one commentator,
these benefits are not intended to be "fully compensatory" but rather are designed to assure
"the injured workman and his dependents a reasonable subsistence while he is unable to
work, and to [effectuate] his speedy rehabilitation and reentry into the labor market." 2 W.
HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INiUREs AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 1.05[5] (1982).
2. The term "exceptions" as used in this Comment refers to instances in which an
injured employee is not limited to recovery of workers' compensation benefits but may also
pursue a suit at law. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d
465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980) (suit at law allowed where it was alleged that
the employer aggravated the employee's injury by withholding information concerning it);
Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972) (suit at
law against insurance carrier allowed for intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978) (suit at law for
intentional infliction of emotional distress allowed because no workers' compensation bene-
fits provided for emotional injury); Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121
Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) (suit at law allowed for assault and battery by employer).
3. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West Supp. 1982). Section 3601(a) provides in relevant
part: "Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover such compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of this division is, except as provided in Section 3706 [concerning
employers who have failed to secure insurance], the exclusive remedy for injury or death of
an employee against the employer or against any other employee of the employer acting
within the scope of his employment. .. "
4. Workers' compensation reflects a policy of allowing "the burden of the wearing out
and destruction of human, as well as inanimate, machinery [to] be borne by industry just as
other costs of production are assumed by the employer and ultimately passed on to the
public." 2 W. HANNA, supra note 1, § 1.05[2]. While policies such as deterring the commis-
ifornia Supreme Court in Bell v. Industrial Vangas5 recently applied
and extended such an exception, the dual capacity doctrine, 6 to allow
an injured worker to maintain a products liability action against his
employer. As a result of the holding in Bell, workers injured by prod-
ucts manufactured7 by their employers may now seek recovery at law
for their injuries, as well as statutory workers' compensation benefits.
In reaching this result, the Bell court sought to apply the dual ca-
pacity doctrine in such a way as to conform to products liability theory.
Following several California court of appeal decisions allowing work-
ers to sue outside of the workers' compensation system when their inju-
ries were caused by defective products manufactured by their
employers, 8 the Bell court held that different legal obligations arise
from the capacities of employer and manufacturer. 9 The court defined
the scope of the employer's second capacity of manufacturer to be in
harmony with the term "manufacturer" for products liability purposes,
focusing on whether the employer had placed the injurious item in the
stream of commerce rather than on any actual manufacturing capacity
of the employer.' 0 This holding has the salutary effect of treating
sion of intentional torts or deterring the production of defective products are not necessarily
in conflict with the basic purpose of workers' compensation, they may be considered extrin-
sic to it.
5. 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1981).
6. The dual capacity doctrine permits an injured employee to sue his or her employer
at law when the injuries arise from a "second capacity" (e.g., doctor, landowner, manufac-
turer) of the employer. The suggestion has recently been made by a respected writer that the
theory be renamed the "dual-persona doctrine." This theory provides that: "An employer
may become a third person, vulnerable to tort suit by an employee, if-and only if-he
possesses a second persona so completely independent from and unrelated to his status as
employer that by established standards the law recognizes it as a separate legal person." 2A
A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.81, at 14-229 (1982).
7. The words "manufactured" and "manufacturer" are terms of art when used in the
context of products liability theory. The proposed Model Uniform Products Liability Act
provides: "'Manufacturer' includes a product seller who designs, produces, makes,
fabricates, constructs, or remanufactures the relevant product or component part of a prod-
uct before its sale to a user or consumer. It includes a product seller or entity not otherwise a
manufacturer that holds itself out as a manufacturer.
"A product seller acting primarily as a wholesaler, distributor, or retailer of a product
may be a 'manufacturer' but only to the extent that it designs, produces, makes, fabricates,
constructs or remanufactures the product before its sale." MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCTS LI-
ABILITY ACT § 102B (Proposed Draft), quoted in 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PROD-
ucTs LIABILITY § 16E, at 3E30-31 (1982).
8. See Moreno v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 110 Cal. App. 3d 179, 167 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1980)
(employee injured by products defectively packaged by employer); Dorado v. Knudsen
Corp., 103 Cal. App. 3d 605, 163 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (employee injured by allegedly defec-
tive crates manufactured by employer); Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d
103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977) (employees injured by allegedly defective scaffolding manu-
factured by employer).
9. 30 Cal. 3d 268, 277, 637 P.2d 266, 272, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30, 36 (1981).
10. Id. at 278-79, 637 P.2d at 272-73, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37.
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workers and members of the general public the same with respect to
suits based upon defective products."1 However, it also has the poten-
tial to place a large number of worker injury cases within the jurisdic-
tion of the superior courts as well as within the workers' compensation
system.12
This Comment assesses the impact of the expansion of the dual
capacity doctrine upon the workers' compensation system in Califor-
nia. The history and function of California's workers' compensation
system and its exclusive remedy provision are presented, followed by a
discussion of the development of the dual capacity exception. The
Comment then analyzes the Bell holding to determine the scope of the
dual capacity exception in the employer-manufacturer situation. Fol-
lowing this analysis, alternative solutions to the problem addressed by
Bell are considered. The Comment concludes that Bell represents a
case of social policy overwhelming legal analysis and an improvident
expansion of the dual capacity doctrine. The Comment argues the
rights of injured workers are better served by changes in, and not ex-
ceptions to, the workers' compensation system.
History of the Workers' Compensation System
Workers' compensation legislation in California, as in other states,
arose out of the increased industrial hazards and changing employer-
employee relationships attending the industrial revolution.13 With an
increase in the number of industrial accidents came the development of
11. Id at 279, 637 P.2d at 273, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
12. "If an initial injury is caused by a defect in a product manufactured by the em-
ployer, the manufacturer-user relationship may be deemed a 'dual capacity,' thus taking the
full consequences completely out of the compensation system." Miller & Goldstein, Double,
Double, Toil and Trouble: Dual Capacity and Workers' Compensation in Caiffornia, 13 U.
WEST L.A. L. REv. 111, 120 (1981); see also NATIONAL LEGAL CENTER FOR THE PUBLIC
INTEREST, FINAL EDITED PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKERS'
COMPENSATION AND WORKPLACE LIABILITY 140 (1981) (comments of Professor Sheila L.
Birnbaum) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
13. In describing these changes, one author has observed that the industrial revolution
radically altered the nature of the work environment: "Since employment could now be
obtained without going through the long apprenticeship procedure, many workers were un-
disciplined, untrained, and unskilled. But the skilled and unskilled alike were exposed to
unfamiliar and dangerous machinery and processes. These new and varied industrial
hazards were further intensified by such factors as long work days, unsafe, badly lit, and ill-
ventilated factory buildings, and the absence of safety devices. In addition, the corporate
form of ownership made its appearance and took over the management of many of these
industries, tending largely to eliminate the former personal relationship between employer
and employee. . . . These extraordinary changes in economic and industrial conditions
necessarily led to an increase in the number of employee injuries and a decrease in the
employers' personal sense of responsibility for the welfare of employees." 2 W. HANNA,
supra note 1, § 1.01[l1].
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the fellow-servant rule14 and the doctrines of assumption of the risk'5
and contributory negligence,' 6 which served to protect employers from
liability to injured employees.17 The scope of the employer's duty to
14. The fellow-servant rule precluded recovery by an injured employee when the in-
jury arose from the negligence of a co-employee acting within the scope of his or her em-
ployment, and not from any fault on the part of the employer. The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, denying a railroad engineer an action against his employer for injuries sus-
tained as a result of the negligence of a switchman, described the rule as follows: "[H]e who
engages in the employment of another for the performance of specified duties and services,
for compensation, takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks and perils incident to
the performance of such services, and in legal presumption, the compensation is adjusted
accordingly. And we are not aware of any principle which should except the perils arising
from the carelessness and negligence of those who are in the same employment. These are
perils. . . incident to the service, and which can be as distinctly foreseen and provided for
in the rate of compensation as any others." Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4
Met.) 49, 57 (1842).
15. The assumption-of-the-risk doctrine in the employer-employee context was clearly
related in theory to the fellow-servant rule. It provided that injured employees could not
recover for injuries resulting from perils knowingly assumed as conditions of the particular
employment. See 2 W. HANNA, supra note 1, § 1.02[3].
16. The doctrine of contributory negligence served to preclude injured workers from
recovering from their employers in cases where both parties were negligent. Addressing
such a situation, the California Supreme Court in Brett v. Frank & Co., 153 Cal. 267, 94 P.
1051 (1908), held that a tannery worker could not recover for injuries sustained when he
stepped into a hole in the floor of his employer's factory. The court said, "The requirement
that the place of employment shall be reasonably safe is itself always to be considered in
connection with the rule of law as to the assumption by the employee of known and under-
stood risks. But, aside from the consideration as to whether under these circumstances negli-
gence in failing to provide a safe place for work may be imputed to the employer in this
case, it is indisputable that the accident was occasioned through the negligent failure of the
plaintiff himself to use ordinary prudence for his own protection." Id at 272, 94 P. at 1052.
17. An example from Professor Larson's treatise on workers' compensation demon-
strates how effectively employers were insulated from liability at common law:
"What then remained of employer's liability? Let us analyze the grounds of liability
statistically, using German figures for 1907, since the German statistics of the period are
unusually full and detailed.
"Classification of causes of accidents
"(1) Negligence or fault of employer 16.81%
"(2) Joint negligence of employer and injured employee 4.66
"(3) Negligence of fellow-servant 5.28
"(4) Acts of God 2.31
"(5) Fault or negligence of injured employee 28.89
"(6) Inevitable accidents connected with the employment 42.05
"It is at once apparent that, with Numbers 2 and 3 barred by common-law defenses,
only under Number 1 is there any possibility of employer liability; accordingly, the em-
ployee at common law was remediless in 83 percent of all cases.
"What of the remaining 16.81 percent? The defense of assumption of risk might still
apply, for even where the employer was at fault, many cases held that the employee, by
continuing to work in spite of the defects or dangers created by the employer, consented to




employees was also limited, resulting in the risks of employment falling
primarily upon the worker.' 8 The common law rules were predicated
upon the assumption that workers voluntarily choose the hazards of
their employment, thus waiving their right to recover damages for inju-
ries arising from dangers that are normal incidents of their employ-
ment.19 The difficulty of proving the employer's negligence and the
difficulty in overcoming the common law defenses left many injured
workers uncompensated. 20
The social problems associated with the lack of remedies for in-
jured workers gave rise to legislative attempts to aid such workers.
2 1
Workers' compensation legislation in California first modified, and
later abolished, the common law defenses of the employer.22 The first
18. An employer's common law duties to his or her employees were limited to provid-
ing a safe place to work, adequate tools and appliances, and a suitable number of fellow
workers. In addition, employers were required to warn their employees of dangers with
which they might be unacquainted and to promulgate employee safety rules. Mitchell, Prod-
ucts Liability, Workmen's Compensation and the Industrial Accident, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 349,
349-50 (1976).
The burden of litigating a claim for industrial injury plus the difficulty of proving em-
ployer negligence together made common law remedies inadequate for workers. As noted
by one commentator, "A number of factors combined to make this [common law] remedy
inadequate: (1) the expense and time consuming nature of litigation for the impecunious
employee of the time; (2) the difficulty of proving the employer's violation of due care;
(3) the natural reluctance of co-employee witnesses to testify against their employer, and
(4) the employer's defenses." 2 W. HANNA, supra note I, § 1.02[3].
19. "Despite the lack of any conscious, voluntary choice on the part of an employee to
subject himself to an occupational hazard, he had no right to collect for an injury arising
from dangers normally incident to his employment. An employee, by his decision to remain
employed despite knowledge of industrial hazards, implicitly relieved his employer of the
common law obligations to safeguard against such hazards." Mitchell, supra note 18, at 350.
20. See id at 351 a.13: "Several states studied the problem; the estimated percentages
of uncompensated industrial injuries were shockingly high. The New York Employer's Lia-
bility Commission's First Report in 1910 estimated the figure to be 87 percent .... Ohio's
commission reported 94 percent ... ." (citations omitted). See also supra note 18.
21. "By the end of the nineteenth century... the coincidence of increasing industrial
injuries and decreasing remedies had produced in the United States a situation ripe for
radical change. . . ." 1 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 5.20, at 37.
22. In 1907, legislation limited the applicability of the defenses of the fellow-servant
rule and assumption of the risk. The fellow-servant rule was modified to provide: "mhe
employer shall be liable for such injury when the same results from the wrongful act, neglect
or default of any agent or officer of such employer, superior to the employee injured, or...
when such injury results from the wrongful act, neglect or default of a co-employee engaged
in another department of labor from that of the employee injured .... " The assumption-
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acts making employer compliance mandatory were passed in 191323
and 1917.24 The Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act
of 1917,25 with amendments, has become California's workers' com-
pensation law.26 The Act is intended to provide a remedy for injured
employees, regardless of fault, based upon the employment relation-
ship, and not upon tort or contract principles.
27
Theory and Function of Workers' Compensation
The California workers' compensation system reflects a social pol-
icy of reallocating the burden of industrial injuries from the worker to
society as a whole by allowing the cost of worker injuries to be included
in the costs of production and later reflected in the prices consumers
pay for products. 28 The system results in a tradeoff for the injured
of-the-risk doctrine was limited to situations in which the injured employee actually knew of
the risk and appreciated its dangers. 1907 Cal. Stat. ch. 97.
In 1911, the California Legislature enacted the Roseberry Act, which provided:
"[I]t shall not be a defense:
"(I) That the employee either expressly or impliedly assumed the risk of the hazard
complained of.
"(2) That the injury or death was caused in whole or in part by the want of ordinary
or reasonable care of a fellow servant."
With regard to the defense of contributory negligence, the Roseberry Act provided:
"[Tihe fact that such [injured] employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence
shall not bar a recovery therein where his contributory negligence was slight and that of the
employer was gross. . . and it shall be conclusively presumed that such employee was not
guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation of any statute enacted for
the safety of employees contributed to such employee's injury .... "1911 Cal. Stat. ch.
399, § 1.
23. The 1913 legislation, known as the Boynton Act, was enacted pursuant to the au-
thority given the California Legislature by article XX, § 21 of the California Constitution
(repealed June 8, 1976, reenacted as article XIV, § 4 of the California Constitution, June 8,
1976). The Boynton Act established a comprehensive system of workers' compensation in-
surance. The Act also introduced the "no-fault" concept into workers' compensation, as
noted by its title: "An act . . . creating a liability on the part of employers to compensate
such employees and their dependents for such accidental injury or death irrespective of the
fault of either party, and providing the means and methods of enforcing such liability."
1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 176.
24. Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act of 1917, 1917 Cal. Stat. ch.
586. This act reenacted much of the Boynton Act, but added some refinements, including
provisions making the status of "uninsured employer" more burdensome. See generally 2
W. HANNA, supra note 1, § 1.04[3](c).
25. 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 586.
26. Codified in CAL. LAH3. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982).
27. As one court observed, "In California the liability under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act is incident to the status of employment and is neither in tort nor in contract."
Record v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 434, 444, 229 P.2d 851, 857 (1951).
28. "The theory underlying the workmen's compensation acts never has been stated
better than in the old campaign slogan, 'the cost of the product should bear the blood of the
workman.' The human accident losses of modem industry are to be treated as a cost of
worker: while gaining a statutory no-fault remedy, the worker waives
the right to sue his or her employer in tort for injuries sustained within
the scope of employment.
29
The chief benefit of the workers' compensation system for the in-
jured employee is that it provides a much speedier and more certain
recovery than a suit at law.30 By abolishing the requirement of proving
negligence on the part of the employer, workers' compensation also
makes some recovery available for injured workers in a large number
of cases where employer fault would be difficult to establish. 31 In con-
trast, the benefits of the system for industrial employers lie in the pro-
tection from excessive liability in tort for employee injuries.32 In a
production, like the breakage of tools or machinery. The financial burden is lifted from the
shoulders of the employee, and placed upon the employer, who is expected to add it to his
costs, and so transfer it to the consumer." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 80, at 530-31 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
An argument has been made that one objective of workers' compensation is "to allocate
the costs of the program among employers and industries according to the extent to which
they are responsible for the losses to employees and other expenses. Such an allocation is
considered equitable by supporters of this objective because each employer and industry
pays its fair share of the cost. The economic effects are considered desirable because this
allocation tends in the long run in a competitive economy to shift resources from hazardous
industries to safe industries and from unsafe employers within an industry to safe employ-
ers. Higher workmen's compensation costs will force employers with hazardous operations
to consider raising their prices. To the extent that consumers will not accept the price in-
crease, employer profits and their willingness to commit resources to this use will decline."
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COMPENDIUM ON
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 25 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
29. As one commentator has observed, "In return for the speedy adjudication of claims
and diminished proof of eligibility under the workmen's compensation statutes, the em-
ployee was forced to waive his common law right to sue the employer in tort for work-
related injuries. A provision that workmen's compensation was to be the 'exclusive remedy'
for work-related injuries was incorporated in all of the state statutes." Mitchell, supra note
18, at 353 (footnotes omitted); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West Supp. 1982).
30. See 2 W. HANNA, supra note 1, § 1.0518]: "ITihe simplicity and inexpensiveness of
compensation procedure encourages the pressing of many claims which might otherwise
have been abandoned. . . . In a great majority of cases, satisfactory adjustment of the
compensation liability is made by the employer or his insurance carrier, without the need for
resorting to the presenting of evidence to a compensation tribunal." But see COMPENDIUM,
supra note 28, at 18: "Employers and labor are both dissatisfied with certain aspects of
workmen's compensation. Labor attacks the system for inadequate benefits, coverage limi-
tations, and exclusion of many injuries, illnesses, and disabilities that they consider job re-
lated. . . .Thus, while the early advocates of workmen's compensation conceived it as a
simple, speedy, efficient, equitable remedy that would reduce litigation over industrial inju-
ries, many doubt their hopes have been realized." See generally Berkowitz, Workmen's Com-
pensation Income Benefts: TheirAdequacy and Equity, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 189 (1973).
31. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 1, § 1.05[8](b), at 1-35.
32. That employers or their insurance carriers will generally be liable for much less in
the way of an award to injured employees under a workers' compensation system is evident
from the contrasting purposes of the two remedies: "A compensation system, unlike a tort
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more general sense, workers' compensation also benefits society by pro-
viding incentives for employers to run safe operations.
33
The quid pro quo of the workers' compensation system in Califor-
nia is that an employee, injured within the course of his or her employ-
ment,34 gains a statutory no-fault remedy but sacrifices the right to
pursue a potentially larger recovery in tort.35 Accordingly, the Califor-
nia workers' compensation statutes provide that where the "conditions
of compensation" 36 exist, workers' compensation provides the exclusive
recovery, does not pretend to restore to the claimant what he has lost; it gives him a sum
which, added to his remaining earning ability, if any, will presumably enable him to exist
without being a burden to others." I A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 2.50, at 11. One commen-
tator has observed with respect to workers' compensation awards: "[Ain employee earning
$500 a month would be entitled to $275 per month for 50 months, a total of $13,750. In
contrast, a jury could award up to 100 per cent of the actual lost earnings and damages for
pain and suffering. [The Arizona Supreme Court] noted recent jury awards of up to
$186,735 for workmen with similar injuries and earning capacities." Comment, Workmen's
Compensation: Arizona's Elusive Exclusive Remedy, 1974 ARIz. ST. L.J. 485, 493-94 (foot-
notes omitted).
33. See Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance. A Re-
view of Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 57, 63 ("One of the few aspects of
workmen's compensation about which there is no disagreement is the impetus it gave to
accident prevention and safety.").
34. The question whether an employee was acting within the "course" or "scope" of his
or her employment at the time of injury has generated a considerable amount of litigation
within the California workers' compensation system. See, e.g., McCarty v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 677, 527 P.2d 617, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1974); Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 756, 172 P.2d 1 (1946); Wil-
liams v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 41 Cal. App. 3d 937, 116 Cal. Rptr. 607
(1974); Gagnebin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 140 Cal. App. 80, 34 P.2d 1052 (1934).
See generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 1, §§ 9.01-9.03; W. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 533.
Since recovery by injured employees under the dual capacity doctrine is not predicated upon
the claim that such employees were outside the scope of their employment at the time of
injury, this subject is beyond the scope of this Comment.
35. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 65.10, at 12-3: "Once a workmen's compensation
act has become applicable. . . it affords the exclusive remedy for the injury by the employee
or his dependents against the employer and insurance carrier. This is part of the quidpro
quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are to some extent put in
balance, for, while the employer assumes a new liability without fault, he is relieved of the
prospect of large damage verdicts."
36. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1982): "Liability for the compensation pro-
vided by this division, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person except as pro-
vided in Section 3706, shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any
injury sustained by his employees arising out of and in the course of the employment and for
the death of any employee if the injury proximately causes death, in those cases where the
following conditions of compensation concur:
"(a) Where, at the time of the injury, both the employer and the employee are subject
to the compensation provisions of this division.
"(b) Where, at the time of the injury, the employee is performing service growing out
of and incidental to his employment, and is acting within the course of his employment.
"(c) Where the injury is proximately caused by the employment, either with or with-
out negligence.
[Vol. 34
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right of recovery against the employer for work-related injuries.37 Dis-
satisfaction with the scope of workers' compensation coverage38 and
the average workers' compensation recovery,39 however, has led an in-
creasing number of injured workers to argue that their injuries should
be compensable outside of the workers' compensation system.
40
The increase in the number of common law suits by injured em-
ployees is also partially the result of changes in the historical "tradeotf"
of rights associated with workers' compensation. Whereas the pros-
pects for recovery for injured workers under the common law were slim
at the time of the enactment of the first workers' compensation law,
4 1
"(d) Where the injury is not caused by the intoxication of the injured employee.
"(e) Where the injury is not intentionally self-inflicted.
"(f) Where the employee has not wilfully and deliberately caused his own death.
"(g) Where the injury does not arise out of an altercation in which the injured em-
ployee is the initial physical aggressor.
"(I) Where the injury does not arise out of voluntary participation in any off duty
recreational, social or athletic activity not constituting part of the employee's work-related
duties, except where such activities are a reasonable expectancy of, or are expressly or im-
pliedly required by, the employment .... "
37. See id § 3601(a), quoted supra note 3.
38. A common criticism of workers' compensation is that it provides inadequate com-
pensation for occupational diseases (e.g., asbestosis) as compared to compensation for indus-
trial accidents. One commentator has noted: "In the small proportion of cases that are
compensated the recovery is very small. Measured against the amounts received in accident
cases, occupational disease recoveries are pathetic. The average payment to a worker who is
totally disabled for life is $23,400 if he or she was injured in an accident. If the injury was
caused by disease, however, the average payment is only $9,700." Kuchins, The Most Exclu-
sive Remedy is No Remedy at All Workers' Compensation Coverage for Occupational Dis-
eases, 32 LAB. L.L 221, 223 (1981). See generally Transcript ofAssembly Committee Hearing
on Report of National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, Assembly Fi-
nance and Insurance Committee, California Legislature (1972).
Another problem with the scope of workers' compensation coverage is that some work-
related injuries such as emotional injuries or injuries to sexual organs have traditionally
been considered noncompensable. See Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833,
839, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447,450 (1978); Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App.
3d 116, 122, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812, 815 (1975).
39. Some commentators have noted that workers' compensation awards may be inade-
quate to compensate workers in many instances. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at
87 (working paper by Professor Jerry J. Phillips); Johnson, Can Our State Workmen's Com-
pensation System Survive?, 3 FORUM 264, 269 (1968); Mitchell, supra note 18, at 353-54;
Comment, Manufacturer's Liability as a Dual Capacity 0/an Empioyer, 12 AKRON L. REv.
747, 749-50 (1979).
40. "With a much more aggressive plaintiffs' bar and the expansion of products liabil-
ity law, we are observing new developments in the area of employees bringing common law
suits directly against employers. Through various novel theories, employees are attempting
to bypass the traditional immunity that employers have had under the workers' compensa-
tion system." PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 116 (comments of Professor Sheila L. Birn-
baum); see also Miller & Goldstein, supra note 12, at 113-14.
41. See supra notes 13-20 & accompanying text.
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theories such as strict products liability42 and comparative negligence 43
make actions at common law much more attractive to injured workers
today.44 The result has been the creation of theories such as the dual
capacity doctrine, which circumvent the exclusivity of workers' com-
pensation and allow recovery at law as well.
Development of Dual Capacity Theory in California
The dual capacity doctrine in California has primarily been devel-
oped in three factual situations: (1) the negligent treatment by an em-
ployer-doctor of his or her own employee; 45 (2) the commission of a
negligent or intentional tort resulting in injury to an employee by an
employer's insurance carrier;46 and (3) an injury to an employee result-
ing from a defective item manufactured by his or her employer.
47
The first California dual capacity case to address the employer-
doctor situation was Duprey v. Shane .48 In Duprey, the California
Supreme Court allowed a suit outside of workers' compensation for a
nurse whose job-related injury was aggravated by the negligent medi-
cal treatment of her employer, a chiropractor.49 In refusing to restrict
the employee to the exclusive remedy of workers' compensation, the
court held that when the employer-doctor elected to treat the injured
employee himself, he undertook a new set of obligations that put him
42. See infra note 101.
43. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §§ 690, 737A-M (Supp. 1982).
44. As one commentator noted, "The original basis for workers' compensation enact-
ments was, as much as anything else, the need to circumvent the harshness of 19th century
common law restrictions on workplace claims. In giving up the highly restrictive 19th cen-
tury common law tort remedy, the employee was not giving up much." PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 12, at 87-88 (working paper by Professor Jerry J. Phillips).
45. See infra notes 48-59 & accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 63-74 & accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 79-88 & accompanying text.
48. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
49. Id at 785-86, 249 P.2d at 10-12. The plaintiff in Duprey was initially injured when
she broke the fall of one of the defendants' patients who had begun to roll off a treatment
table. The plaintiff reported that as a result of catching the patient, she suffered a "terrific
yank" to her shoulder. She subsequently reported to her employer that she had begun to
have pains in her right arm and shoulder and had also begun to suffer headaches.
After the employer was informed of the injury, the plaintiff was treated over a five-day
period by a chiropractor, Dr. Harrison, in the defendants' office. The injured employee was
also seen by the defendant, Dr. Shane. After these treatments, the plaintiff began to suffer
"terrible headaches" and noticed that her head "began to fall to one side." Id at 787, 249
P.2d at 11. Despite these symptoms, the defendant chiropractors did not take X-rays of the
employee's spine until five days after the initial injury. The facts showed the plaintiff had
suffered a dislocated vertebra. According to the plaintiff's medical experts, the manipulation
treatments she had received from the defendants probably caused the injury. Id at 788, 249
P.2d at 12.
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in the position of a "person other than the employer" for purposes of
the Labor Code.50 Thus, by considering the doctor to be a "third
party" as well as an "employer," the Duprey court avoided the unam-
biguous exclusivity language of California Labor Code section 3601.l
The analysis of the factual situation in Duprey led the court to the
conclusion that where the "dual legal personality" of the employer is
apparent, recognizing the fact is "realistic and not legalistic."' 52 Ac-
cordingly, the Duprey court held that limiting the worker to a workers'
compensation recovery would be unjust since the employment relation-
ship had been essentially transmuted by the subsequent treatment of
the plaintiff into one of doctor and patient.53 The aggravation of the
employee's initial, work-related injury was an incident of the doctor-
patient, not of the employer-employee, relationship and the worker was
allowed the same right to pursue a malpractice action as any other
patient.5 4
The social policy justification for the Duprey holding was the de-
50. Id at 793, 249 P.2d at 15. Actions against third parties under workers' compensa-
tion are not abrogated by virtue of Labor Code § 3852, which provides in part: "The claim
of an employer [sic] for compensation does not affect his claim or right of action for all
damages proximately resulting from such injury or death against any person other than the
employer." CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852 (West Supp. 1982).
51. 39 Cal. 2d at 793, 249 P.2d at 15. Unless the employer is defined as a third party,
the following language from Labor Code § 3601(a) would appear to preclude the type of
action pursued in Duprey: "[T]he right to recover such compensation. . . is. . .the exclu-
sive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer." CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3601(a) (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
A third party analogy similar to the one made by the court in Duprey was employed by
the United States Supreme Court in Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963), reh g denied,
375 U.S. 872 (1963). In Reed, the Supreme Court allowed an injured longshoreman recov-
ery against his employer both within the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act (which is similar in function to workers' compensation) and outside of the Act, on
the theory the employer was also a boat charterer, with the common law duty to provide a
seaworthy vessel. In reaching this result, the Reed court observed that "foInly blind adher-
ence to the superficial meaning of a statute could prompt us to ignore the fact that Pan-
Atlantic was not only an employer of longshoremen but was also a bareboat charterer and
operator of a ship and, as such, was charged with the traditional, absolute, and nondelegable
obligation of seaworthiness which it should not be permitted to avoid." Id at 415.
52. 39 Cal. 2d at 793, 249 P.2d at 15.
53. Id Duprey has occasionally been distinguished from other dual capacity cases on
the basis of the sequential nature of the roles assumed by the employer-doctor "In Duprey
...the defendant stepped out of his general role as employer into a special capacity as
physician. The Duprey injury did not occur during the course of the employee's employ-
ment by Dr. Shane, but rather during his medical treatment of her as his patient." Bell v.
Industrial Vangas, 30 Cal. 3d 268, 285, 637 P.2d 266, 277, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30, 41 (1981)
(Richardson, J., dissenting); see also Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103,
111, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797, 801 (1977) ("While it may be that a defendant cannot simultaneously
be two distinct entities, a defendant can act in two distinct capacities sequentially.") (empha-
sis in original).
54. 39 Cal. 2d at 793, 249 P.2d at 15.
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terrence of negligent medical care.55 The employer-doctor could have
discharged his duty to provide medical treatment 56 for the injured em-
ployee by sending the employee to another doctor. The employee
would then have had a right to sue that doctor for malpractice.5 7 The
court found no logical reason that the employer-doctor should be
shielded from liability for his negligence when he elected to treat the
injured worker himself 5 8 Moreover, the Duprey court refused to ex-
tend the "defensive provisions" of workers' compensation to bar ac-
tions to recover for liabilities that do not arise from the principal
employer-employee relationship.5 9
The holding in Duprey laid the foundation for the dual capacity
doctrine but did not define its parameters. The negligent acts of the
employer-doctor in Duprey were so removed from the employer-em-
ployee relationship that allowing the employee to sue in tort flowed
naturally from the policy of the workers' compensation system that
rights against third parties are not abrogated.60 Because of the distinct
legal obligations flowing from the capacities of doctor and employer,
the employer-doctor situation presented in Duprey has remained a reli-
able factual situation for dual capacity recovery in California.6' The
55. Id
56. Id CAL. LAB. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1982) provides: "Medical, surgical, chiro-
practic, and hospital treatment, including nursing, medicines, medical and surgical supplies,
crutches, and apparatus, including artificial members, which is reasonably required to cure
or relieve from the effects of the injury shall be provided by the employer ....
57. "Had [Dr. Shane] sent plaintiff to the insurance doctor and had that doctor been
negligent in treating the industrial injury, that doctor would have been liable for malprac-
tice." 39 Cal. 2d at 793, 249 P.2d at 15; see Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Em-
ployer Suability.- The Dual Capacity Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 818, 822 (1974).
58. 39 Cal. 2d at 793, 249 P.2d at 15.
59. Id at 794, 249 P.2d at 16. The comment by the Duprey court that it would not
extend the "defensive provisions" of workers' compensation reflects the view that the exclu-
sive remedy provision may serve as a shield from liability for employers. "[WMhen the exclu-
sive-remedy provision is unconditionally applied, the employer-third-party-tortfeasor can be
comfortably aware that should injury occur because of his negligence, he or his carrier will
be liable not to the full extent allowable in a common law recovery but only to the limited
extent of the compensation benefit." Comment, supra note 57, at 832.
60. The limited liability enjoyed by employers under the workers' compensation stat-
utes is not intended to extend to third parties: "[Tlhe employee's right against the negligent
third party is precisely the same as if the injury had occured outside the employer-employee
relationship. This right of action is preserved since the compensation system was not
designed to provide immunity to strangers." 2 W. HANNA, supra note 1, § 23.0111].
61. The California Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the use of the dual capacity the-
ory in the employer-doctor situation in D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 3d 66 1,
669, 613 P.2d 238, 243-44, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177, 182-83 (1980). The court stated: "In treating
plaintiffs disease the county owed her a duty separate and distinct from its duty as her
employer, and this was the duty to provide medical care free of negligence-the same duty
that it owes to any member of the public who becomes a patient at its hospital." See also
Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655, 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (1972).
Courts in other states are split as to whether to apply the dual capacity theory in the
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only court-imposed restriction upon the use of dual capacity in the em-
ployer-doctor situation has been the requirement that an employer
must do more than merely give first aid to an injured employee.
6 2
Another area in which the dual capacity doctrine has been applied
in California concerns the negligent or intentional torts of an em-
ployer's workers' compensation insurance carrier. The California La-
bor Code provides that an employer's insurer is "identified" with the
employer for liability purposes.6 3 An argument has been'made, based
on the logic of Duprey, that when an insurance carrier commits a negli-
gent or intentional tort, the carrier should be considered a person
"other than the employer" and should be liable at law to an injured
worker.64 California courts, however, have been reluctant to character-
ize the negligence of an insurance carrier as an activity outside of its
normal capacity justifying separation of the insurer from the employer
for liability purposes.65
An early attempt to apply the dual capacity doctrine to the actions
of an insurer occurred in Hazelwerd v. Industrial Indemnity Ex-
change.66 The court in Hazelwerdt refused to recognize the insurer's
separate capacity 67 in the face of an allegation that the insurer had con-
spired with the attending physician to "mitigate and lessen" the plain-
tifi's true condition.68 The Hazelwerdt court distinguished Duprey,
holding that the defendant "does not become a 'person other than the
employer-doctor context. Compare McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 82 IMI. App. 3d
77, 402 N.E.2d 412 (1980); Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co., 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 378 N.E.2d
488 (1978); Delamotte v. Unitcast Div. of Midland Ross Corp., 64 Ohio App. 2d 159, 411
N.E.2d 814 (1978) (allowing dual capacity suits), with McAlister v. Methodist Hosp., 550
S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1977) (rejecting dual capacity doctrine). In the MeAlister case, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee noted that the facts before it were very similar to those in
Duprey. However, the court held: "[I]n the field of workmen's compensation law, and in
suits by a worker against his employer, the initial injury is the cause of all that follows, even
where there is superimposed upon the original injury, a new, or additional or independent
injury during the course of treatment, negligent or otherwise." Id at 245.
62. See Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 499, 125 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1975);
Deauville v. Hall, 188 Cal. App. 2d 535, 10 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1961).
63. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3850(b) (West 1971) provides: "'Employer' includes insurer as
defined in this division." (emphasis added).
64. See Nation v. Certainteed Corp., 84 Cal. App. 3d 813, 149 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1978);
Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172 Cal. App. 2d 731, 342 P.2d 976 (1959).
65. See infra notes 70-73 & accompanying text.
66. 157 Cal. App. 2d 759, 321 P.2d 831 (1958).
67. Id at 763, 321 P.2d at 833.
68. Id at 760-61, 321 P.2d at 832. The plaintiff inHazewerdt suffered an initial, work-
related injury to his back, resulting in a finding by the Industrial Accident Commission of a
100% permanent disability. The defendant was subsequently ordered to provide the plaintiff
with medical treatment. The plaintiff alleged that the insurer-defendant's doctor then negli-
gently failed to recommend surgery on the plaintiffs spine and that the defendant conspired
with the doctor to deprive the plaintiff of medical care by minimizing the true nature of the
plaintiff's condition.
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employer,' merely by conspiring to do something the liability for which
is already covered by workmen's compensation law."
69
A different situation is presented, under California law, when the
insurer's intentional act injures the plaintiff employee. Dual capacity
recovery by an injured employee in this situation has been justified on
the theory that the original identification of the employer and its in-
surer under the workers' compensation system does not encompass the
commission of intentional torts by the insurer.
In Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange,70 the plaintiff alleged that
her employer's insurance carrier caused her to suffer a mental and
physical breakdown when its investigating agents enticed her to per-
form acts beyond her physical capabilities. 71 While holding that the
negligence of the insurer in failing to control its employees did not sug-
gest a "dual capacity" under Duprey, the Unruh court found that the
commission of an intentional tort did take the insurer outside of its
normal role as compensation carrier and into a "second capacity.
'72
Thus, although in most instances injuries resulting from the intentional
torts of employers are compensable only under the workers' compensa-
tion system, 73 an intentional tort by an insurer may justify a suit against
it as a third party tortfeasor.74
One criticism of Unruh has been that the insurer was not really
undertaking the new obligations of a separate legal capacity by com-
mitting an intentional tort.75 Unlike Duprey, where the employer-doc-
69. Id at 765, 321 P.2d at 835. One California court of appeal has similarly refused to
find a dual capacity for the insurer's allegedly negligent inspection, holding that safety in-
spections are within the "normal role" of an insurer. Williams v. State Compensation Ins.
Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975).
70. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
71. Id at 621, 498 P.2d at 1066-67, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19. Specifically, the plaintiff
in Unruh alleged that one of the insurance agents "befriended her" for the purpose of inves-
tigating the validity of her claim. On one occasion the agent took the plaintiff to Disney-
land, enticed her to cross rope and barrel bridges, and then shook the bridges while another
agent filmed these activities. The film of the plaintiff was subsequently shown at a hearing
of the Industrial Accident Commission. Upon learning of the agents' fraudulent behavior,
the plaintiff suffered a mental and physical breakdown.
72. Id. at 630, 498 P.2d at 1073, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
73. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 473, 612 P.2d 948,
953, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1980); Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 459, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 710, 715 (1968). Contra Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 841, 147
Cal. Rptr. 447, 452 (1978); Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 780, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 621, 636 (1975). See generally Comment, Intentional Employer Torts: A Matterfor the
Calfornia Legislature, 15 U.S.F. L. REv. 651 (1981).
74. See supra notes 70-72 & accompanying text.
75. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 72.86, at 14-259: "The court [in Unruh] in effect
said that an insurance carrier remained an insurance carrier if it carried out a non-medical
investigation of a case properly, but that it somehow became a different legal person when it
carried out the same kind of investigation in an intentionally tortious manner. The distinc-
tion between this situation and all the legitimate dual-capacity examples here recognized is
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tor undertook an obligation in the separate legal capacity of doctor, in
Unruh the defendant committed the tortious acts in its original capac-
ity as insurer.76 This conceptual distinction has become important in
the employer-manufacturer situation. In this situation, when an article
is a routine and integral part of the employment, an employer arguably
does not become a separate legal persona by manufacturing it and pro-
viding it to his or her employees. 7 The difficulty of determining
whether employer and manufacturer are separate capacities in a given
factual situation has kept courts in many jurisdictions from applying
the dual capacity doctrine in the employer-manufacturer situation.
78
The requirements for dual capacity recovery in the employer-man-
ufacturer context were first described in the California court of appeal
decision of Douglas v. . & J Gallo Winery.79  In Douglas, two of
Galo's employees were injured when an elevator scaffolding on which
they were working collapsed. 0 The injured workers argued that the
scaffolding was manufactured by the defendant for sale to the public,
obvious. In all these cases, the second persona was one recognized by law as having its own
separate legal entity and its own set of separate legal obligations." See also Miller & Gold-
stein, supra note 12, at 125-26.
76. The holding in Unruh was most likely the product of a developing policy to allow
common law actions against employers who intentionally injure their employees: "MWJe
perceive in Magliulo, Meyer and Unruh a trend toward allowing an action at law for injuries
suffered in the employment if the employer acts deliberately for the purpose of injuring the
employee or if the harm resulting from the intentional misconduct consists of aggravation of
an initial work-related injury." Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d
465, 476, 612 P.2d 948, 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 865 (1980).
77. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 72.83, at 14-244; see Birnbaum & Wrubel, California
Supreme Court Adopts a "Manufacturer" Liability Exception to the Exclusive Remedy of
Workers' Compensation, 17 FoRUm 939, 943-46 (1982).
78. Courts in many jurisdictions have declined to apply the dual capacity doctrine on
the theory that the employment relationship, and thus the exclusive remedy provision, pre-
dominates over an employer's other capacity. See, e.g., Mapson v. Montgomery White
Trucks, Inc., 357 So. 2d 971, 972-73 (Ala. 1978) (suit by injured repairman against employer
who sold, manufactured, and repaired trucks); Longever v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 408
N.E.2d 857, 859 (Mass. 1980) (suit by employee injured by allegedly defective casting
machine manufactured by one of the employer's divisions); Billy v. Consolidated Machine
Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 412 N.E.2d 934, 939, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879, 884 (1980) (suit by
spouse of decedent alleging defective design and manufacture of "boring ram" by em-
ployer); Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466, 469-70 (N.D. 1978) (suit by
lineman for injuries sustained when clothes caught in wire winder, alleging both intentional
injury by employer and manufacturer dual capacity); see also Cohn v. Spinks Indus., Inc.,
602 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (suit in wrongful death by spouse and child of heli-
copter pilot killed in crash alleging dual capacity of decedent's employer as lessor of helicop-
ters to the public).
79. 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
80. Id at 106-07, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 798-99. The exact manufacturing activity under-
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rather than solely for use in its own business. 8' The appellate court
upheld the trial court and allowed the workers to sue their employer at
law on the theory that by undertaking to manufacture the item which
injured the plaintiffs, and by selling the item to the public, the em-
ployer occupied the second capacity of manufacturer.
2
The factual situation in Douglas presents an iiteresting contrast to
the situation in Duprey v. Shane. In Duprey, the aggravation of the
employee's original, work-related injury occurred in a context outside
her normal duties as a nurse.83 In Douglas, the workers were injured
while performing a task that was a normal incident of their employ-
ment.84 The Douglas court did not, however, focus its analysis on the
question whether the employer-employee relationship predominated
over the second relationship alleged. Instead, the Douglas court took a
significant step beyond Duprey by changing the focus of the dual ca-
pacity determination from an analysis of the employer-employee rela-
tionship to an analysis of the various capacities of the employer.85
Under the analysis applied by the Douglas court the employment
does not have to be transmuted into a new relationship for an injured
worker to be allowed to sue his or her employer in tort. Rather, the
activities of the employer outside of the employment relationship may
be sufficient by themselves to justify such a suit.86 This represents a
taken by the defendant is unclear from the opinion itself, but as the court noted, the causes
of action were based on:
"1. Negligent manufacture, sale, etc., of the elevator scaffold device.
"2. Failure to provide safe place to work (admitted by appellants as being barred by
the Workers' Compensation remedy ...).
"3. Breach of warranty in the manufacture, sale, etc., of the cables and socket of the
scaffold.
"4. Products liability based on defective manufacture, sale, etc. of the scaffold and its
parts." Id at 106-07, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
81. Id. at 107, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
82. Id at 110, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
83. See supra notes 52-59 & accompanying text.
84. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 106, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 798. Unlike the situation in Duprey, the
injuries to the workers in Douglas which resulted in the suit against their employer arose
directly out of the on-the-job accident, the collapse of the elevator scaffolding.
85. "Characterizing a defendant as an 'employer' and therefore automatically cloaked
with immunity from common law suit is a simplification that tends to cloud proper analysis.
The focus should be on the defendant's responsibility for his own acts or omissions where a
different duty to take care or make sure that care is taken arises than that imposed on an
employer." Id at 110, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
86. The emphasis in Douglas on the activities of the employer can be contrasted with
the approach taken in many jurisdictions which focuses on the activities of the employee.
The latter approach weighs the value of the exclusive remedy provision heavily, and con-
cludes that if the injury was sustained within the course of employment, the employer's
actions in another capacity are irrelevant. Courts focusing on the activities of the employee
justify restricting injured workers to recovery under the workers' compensation system on
the basis of protecting the integrity of the system. See, e.g., Needham v. Fred's Frozen
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strained application of the dual capacity theory initiated in Duprey, as
the injuries are still the direct product of the employment relationship8 7
even though the employer's capacity theoretically might be "changed"
into that of a manufacturer. Thus, one criticism of the Douglas ap-
proach to dual capacity is that it does not require a separate legal per-
sona of the employer, but rather only a separate theory of liability.88
One important parallel between the holdings of Duprey and Doug-
las is that both courts justified employer liability on the basis that each
employer had the option to obtain elsewhere the goods or service that
injured the workers. In holding that the item that injured the plaintiffs
was not intended for the "sole use" of the employer, the Douglas court
noted that by "electing to manufacture elevator scaffolding for the pub-
lic rather than obtaining it from a third party manufacturing firm, the
defendant should be held to the standard of care of manufacturers gen-
erally."89 As in Duprey, the employer became a third party by under-
taking an obligation that could have been performed by another party
who would have been liable to the employee for negligent
performance.90
An important requirement articulated in Douglas is that the prod-
Foods, Inc., 171 Ind. App. 671, 672-74, 359 N.E.2d 544, 545 (1977) (products liability action
by employee of frozen foods business injured by exploded pressure cooker, court denied
suit, noting: "Inasmuch as [plaintiffs] injury arose out of and in the course of his employ-
ment, it... was precisely the kind of injury the Workmen's Compensation Act was in-
tended to cover."; Billy v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 160, 412
N.E.2d 934, 939, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879, 884 (1980) ("[W]e cannot sanction the circumvention of
this clear legislative plan by approving a theory which would permit the employer to be sued
in his capacity as property owner or manufacturer of equipment used on the job site.").
87. This situation is in contrast to that of the nurse in Duprey, whose capacity was-
really that of a patient at the time of the aggravation of her injury. See supra note 53 &
accompanying text.
88. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 72.81, at 14-230-31: 'The choice of the term 'per-
sona' is not the result of any predilection for elegant Latinisms for their own sake; it is
dictated by the literal language of the typical third-party statute, which usually defines a
third party, in the first instance, as 'a person other than the employer.' This is quite different
from 'a person acting in a capacity other than that of employer.' The question is not one of
activity, or relationship-it is one of identity."
89. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 110, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
90. The third party analogy applied by the Douglas court seems compelling in the situ-
ation where the injury-producing item is designed primarily for sale to the public and is only
incidentally used in "defendant's other activities." Id at 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 803. In such
a case, the employer might actually have a choice whether or not to use the item. When the
employer chooses to use such products in its other operations, it may be considered a "third-
party manufacturer." The question Douglas left open, however, is how an employer should
be treated when production of the allegedly defective item is the employer's primary activ-
ity. In such a situation, the purpose of the employment relationship is the production or
distribution of the item, and the two capacities of "employer" and "manufacturer" become
inseparable. See supra notes 56-59 & accompanying text.
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uct injuring the worker be one that is offered for sale to the public.9'
This aspect of the Douglas opinion has an important limiting effect on
the scope of the dual capacity doctrine. As a result of this requirement
there is no separate tort liability for an injury resulting from a defective
product that is supplied to the worker solely as a tool of the employ-
ment. 92 In this regard, the test for a finding of dual capacity closely
parallels the requirement of strict products liability that the item be
placed into the "stream of commerce.
'93
Although there was a suggestion in the Douglas opinion that a
case-by-case analysis is necessary to determine whether a particular
employer's manufacturing activity is sufficiently distinct from the em-
ployment relationship to justify tort liability,94 the Douglas holding ac-
tually used the products liability definition of "manufacturer" as the
standard for employer-manufacturer dual capacity liability.95 In this
regard, the Douglas court sought to accommodate the important poli-
cies underlying both workers' compensation and products liability.
The court questioned, for instance, whether the right of recovery repre-
sented by products liability theory could be encompassed by the work-
ers' compensation system, which predated the development of products
liability theory. 96 Furthermore, as a matter of social policy, the court
refused to frustrate the important loss-distribution policy of products
liability by restricting injured workers to a workers' compensation rem-
edy on the "chance circumstance" that the manufacturer also happened
91. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 803. The Douglas court sought to limit
application of its holding to "a defendant who engages in manufacturing for sale to the
general public. A single or occasional disconnected act does not constitute engaging in such
manufacturing. The defendant who designs or manufactures a product for his own use and
subsequently does sell an extra one of the products to his neighbor or to a similar business is
not thereby subjected to manufacturers' liability when his own employee is injured in using
the product." Id
92. 'Id at 109, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 800. The Douglas court distinguished two court of
appeal decisions, Shook v. Jacuzzi, 59 Cal. App. 3d 978, 129 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1976), and
Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975),
in which dual capacity liability was refused because the allegedly injurious items were man-
ufactured solely as tools for the use of the defendants' employees. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 109,
137 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
93. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 112-13, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
94. Id. at 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 803: "The proper standard for determining whether a
defendant is engaged in manufacturing so as to make applicable the manufacturer's liability
imposed hereunder is the exercise ofjudgment on a case by case basis to decide if the manu-
facturing by the particular defendant is such as to justify the conclusion that it is part and
parcel of an activity which occupies the effort, attention and time of the defendant for the
purpose of possible profit on a continuing basis."
95. Id at 107, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799: "For purposes of this opinion, the term 'manufac-
turer' includes manufacturer, seller, distributor or any other person who may be subject to
products liability."
96. id at 112, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
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to be their employer.97 Thus, the Douglas court gave the dual capacity
doctrine analytical force of its own and used it to support the policies
underlying products liability theory. In so doing, the Douglas court set
the stage for the elaboration of the products liability-dual capacity ra-
tionale in Bell.
98
Products Liability Policy Overcomes Exclusivity of Remedy: Bell v.
Industrial Vangas
The California Supreme Court in Bell v. Industrial Vangas99 sig-
nificantly limited the scope of the exclusive remedy provision by fol-
lowing Douglas in declaring a products liability dual capacity
exception. The plaintiff in Bell was a propane deliveryman who was
injured in a fire resulting from alleged defects of "tank trucks, storage
97. Id. at 113, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
98. Two recent California court of appeal decisions, Moreno v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 110
Cal. App. 3d 179, 167 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1980), and Dorado v. Knudsen Corp., 103 Cal. App.
3d 605, 163 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980), illustrate applications of the dual capacity test formulated
in Douglas.
In Moreno, the employer, a retailer, also had a division whose principal business was
the manufacture of pool chemicals. The retail division directed one of its stockboys, the
plaintiff, to pour out chlorine and muriatic acid from leaking, unlabelled bottles. The em-
ployee then poured the contents of the bottles together and was seriously injured from in-
halation of fumes. 110 Cal. App. 3d at 181, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 748. The issue presented by
the facts in Moreno was whether the actions of the employee constituted a "use" of the
product for products liability purposes. The defendant argued the items were not utilizied
by the employee as tools in his employment, unlike the situation in Douglas, and so the
injury did not arise from an "expected" use of the bottles. The Moreno court, however,
applied a liberal standard of "use" and held that movement of the bottles was a sufficiently
expected use under the products liability rationale of Douglas to justify allowing the injured
worker to sue his employer at law. Although this result follows from the tests established by
Douglas, Moreno has been criticized as possibly laying the foundation for dual capacity
suits based solely upon exposure to dangerous substances in the workplace. See Miller &
Goldstein, supra note 12, at 124.
Dorado reveals another important area in which the Douglas rationale may be applied
in the future--cases in which one business asserts the exclusive remedy provision of workers'
compensation based upon its ownership of another business. In Dorado, the defendant al-
leged that as the limited partner of the injured worker's employer, the exclusive remedy
provision should shield it from tort liability for the negligent manufacture of crates that
injured the plaintiff. 103 Cal. App. 3d at 609, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 480. In allowing the worker
to pursue a tort action, the Dorado court noted that partners should not be given the benefit
of the exclusive remedy provision when their acts are not undertaken "on behalf of the
partnership." Id at 614, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 482. This result is justifiable under the logic of
Duprey and Unruh, since the activity that led to the plaintiffs injury (manufacture of the
crates) was undertaken for the benefit of the defendant and not the plaintiffs employer.
Given the increasing complexity of business ownership, however, fact situations similar to
Dorado could provide an area of expansion for dual capacity theory. See also Mercer v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 285-86, 361 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1976).
99. 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1981).
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tanks, valves, couplings, hoses and other equipment."' ° Using lan-
guage associated with products liability,101 Bell alleged that his em-
ployer and the customer to whom he made the delivery "were engaged
in various activities constituting the marketing of defective prod-
100. Id The plaintiff, William Bell, was delivering propane gas to Long Chemical Co.,
a customer of his employer, Industrial Vangas, Inc., at the time of his injury. Plaintiff did
not allege that the injury was not sustained within the course of his employment as a route
salesman for the defendant. Accordingly, the plaintiff pursued his workers' compensation
remedy to final judgment prior to initiating his civil suit. The defendant argued successfully
in the trial court that Bell's claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision.
Opposing the plaintiff's appeal, the defendant argued: (1) that the dual capacity doc-
trine did not apply in the employer-manufacturer context; and (2) that by recovering his
workers' compensation award, Bell had elected his remedy and could not later pursue a civil
recovery. The court of appeal reversed on both grounds, holding that the dual capacity
doctrine applied and that under the facts presented by the plaintiff, a workers' compensation
award and a tort recovery were not inconsistent remedies. Petition for Hearing in the
Supreme Court by Respondent Industrial Vangas, Inc. at 2-3 (Oct. 27, 1980).
The scope of Industrial Vangas' "manufacturing activity" is indicated by the following
passage from the opinion in the Court of Appeal for the Second District: "The declaration
of Ron Paliughi, respondent's vice president of operations and planning, stated that respon-
dent 'did not manufacture any products or items of equipment which were present on the
premises of LONG CHEMICAL, INC. at the time of the alleged accident' except for the
propane bulk delivery truck, of which appellant was the driver and operator. That truck
was 'assembled' by respondent 'using a 1969 Chevrolet truck chassis manufactured by Gen-
eral Motors Corporation, on which was fabricated a delivery system, skirting, metering and
other component parts to adapt the truck for the specific use of INDUSTRIAL VANGAS,
INC. in its propane dispensing operations.' The declaration further stated that with limited
exceptions all of respondent's fleet of trucks were assembled exclusively for respondent's
own use in propane dispensing operations. The exceptions were: out of approximately 200
bulk delivery trucks assembled since the model year 1969, respondent sold 4 exclusively to
other propane dealers primarily as a customer service to companies with whom respondent
does regular business in the wholesale dispensing of propane. In addition, eight 1969 model
trucks had been withdrawn from service, dismantled, and then the vehicle chassis sold." 110
Cal. App. 3d 463, 466, 168 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43 (1980) (opinion subsequently deleted when
California Supreme Court granted hearing).
101. Products liability actions against manufacturers may take three forms: negligence
suits, actions based upon implied or express warranty, and suits based upon strict liability in
tort. The last-named theory was developed in the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Noting that strict
liability theory removes the difficulties associated with proving manufacturer fault under a
negligence theory, or an implied or express contract under a warranty theory, the Greenman
court held that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being." Id at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
The Greenman rule is similar to that adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965):
"(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business
of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
"(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all
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ucts."10 2 In other words, plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
helped to place defective articles into the "stream of commerce."' 0 3
The defendant, Industrial Vangas, presented two arguments: (1) it
was not a "manufacturer" within the meaning given that term by strict
products liability doctrine, and (2) allowing the employee recovery in
tort would upset the balance of the workers' compensation system.1°4
The first argument is of particular interest because the court in Bell,
unlike the court in Douglas, addressed the question whether the de-
fendant had manufactured the allegedly defective items. The Bell
court noted that Industrial Vangas had not actually manufactured any
of the items involved in the accident. Rather, its "manufacturer's" lia-
bility arose from its involvement in the "marketing or distribution" of
the items. 10 5 Because the defendant negated only the claim that it had
actually manufactured the items, the plaintiff in Bell was able to avoid a
summary judgment based upon the exclusive remedy provision.1 0 6 For
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not
bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller."
The adoption of strict liability in tort by the California Supreme Court and the Restate-
ment of Torts has spurred many courts to abandon warranty theory, with its ties to the law
of contracts and sales. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, § 16A(3), at 3B-13
(1981 & Supp. 1982).
102. Bell alleged the defendants "were engaged in the business of designing ... con-
structing, assembling, processing, preparing, testing, inspecting, maintaining, repairing, in-
stalling, endorsing, selling, leasing, bailing, licensing the use of, and otherwise marketing"
defective products. 30 Cal. 3d at 271, 637 P.2d at 268, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
103. The term "stream of commerce" connotes an approach by which those who place a
product in the stream of commerce, i.e. manufacturers, retailers, and wholesalers, are liable
for injuries caused by product defect to any foreseeable user.
As the California Supreme Court held in Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d
578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969), bystanders are also protected by products liability
theory: "If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the consumer
or user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foreseeable. Consumers
and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit their purchases to
articles manufactured by reputable retailers, whereas the bystander ordinarily has no such
opportunities." Id at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
104. 30 Cal. 3d at 271-72, 637 P.2d at 268, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
105. Id at 271 n.1, 637 P.2d at 268 n.1, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 32 n.l: "Vangas argues that
even assuming workers' compensation is not the exclusive remedy, Bell has failed to state a
cause of action in strict products liability because Vangas is not in the business of manufac-
turing or marketing any of the allegedly defective products. While an uncontradicted decla-
ration submitted in support of Vangas' motion adequately refutes any suggestion that
Vangas was in the business of manufacturing or marketing the delivery truck driven by Bell,
the complaint also refers to numerous other allegedly defective products which proximately
cause Bell's injuries. While the declaration asserts such products were not manufactured by
Vangas, it does not similarly deny any involvement in marketing or distribution which may
be sufficient to give rise to strict liability for a defective product. . . . Since a defendant
moving for summary judgment has the burden of negating every alternative theory of liabil-
ity presented by the pleadings ... .the Vangas declaration is insufficient to support the
granting of summary judgment." (citations omitted).
106. Id
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the defendant to have prevailed on a summary judgment motion it
would have had to negate "every alternative theory of liability
presented by the pleadings."'
' 0 7
In holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action in prod-
ucts liability, the Bell court made subtle, yet important, changes in the
dual capacity doctrine. The most significant of these changes was the
expansion of the products liability exception to encompass all of the
different capacities giving rise to strict liability in tort. 10 8 The test for
dual capacity in the employer-manufacturer situation after Bell is
whether the employer by some activity has helped to put a harmful
item into the stream of commerce, not whether the employer has an
actual manufacturing capacity distinct from the employment relation-
ship. The Bell court, by citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc. ,109 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. ,1o and Price v. Shell Oil Co.,"'
made clear that an injured employee may sidestep the exclusive remedy
provision by alleging his or her employer aided in the marketing of a
defective product, even though the employer's activities outside of the
employer-employee relationship did not constitute any significant man-
ufacturing activity." 1
2
The other change in the dual capacity analysis apparent in Bell is
that the focus of the second capacity determination is now exclusively
on the activities of the employer, rather than on the activities of the
employer and employee taken together. The test to be applied, accord-
ing to the Bell court, is:
If the duty flows solely from the employment relationship and the
injury "arises out of' and "during the course of" that employment,
then the recited policy considerations behind the exclusive remedy in
workers' compensation mandating that the employer be immune
from tort liability apply. If, however an additional concurrent duty
flows from an "extra" employer status or a relationship that is dis-
tinct from that of employer-employee and invokes a different set of
107. Id
108. Id. at 270-71, 637 P.2d at 267-68, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 31-32. The Douglas opinion in
effect left this issue open since it was only faced with the allegation that the defendant had
actually manufactured the scaffolding: "We hold that a plaintiff may state a cause of action
(or causes of action) based on manufacturer's liability even though the defendant is also the
plaintiff's employer and the alleged injuries take place in the course of employment, pro-
vided that the product is manufactured by the employer for sale 'to the public' rather than
being manufactured for the sole use of the employer." 69 Cal. App. 3d at 107, 137 Cal. Rptr.
at 799.
109. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (establishing strict products
liability against manufacturers).
110. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (holding retailers strictly
liable in tort as part of overall marketing enterprise).
111. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970) (holding strict liability appli-
cable to bailors and lessors).
112. 30 Cal. 3d at 271, 637 P.2d at 267, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 31-32.
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obligations, then a second capacity arises and the employer status is
coincidental.11
3
In contrast to the original Duprey standard of a second capacity
creating a new legal persona,1 4 the Bell approach represents a signifi-
cant expansion of the dual capacity doctrine. While the employee in-
jury in Duprey was the result of activities of the employer in the second
capacity as doctor, the injury in Bell arose from the supplying of defec-
tive tools to employees, an act which should be considered within the
employer's original capacity.'1 5 Under the products liability definition
of "manufacturer" however, the employer in Bell occupied a second
capacity because of its activities helping to put the items into the stream
of commerce.
116
The dissent in Bell by Justice Richardson illustrates an approach
to the dual capacity determination that focuses on whether the employ-
ment relationship predominates in the context of the employee's injury.
The dissent cogently distinguished the factual situation in Duprey from
that presented by Bell:
There was no point during Bell's use of the equipment that he ceased
to be an employee. In Duprey, on the other hand, the defendant
stepped out of his general role as employer into a special capacity as
physician. The Duprey injury did not occur during the course of her
employment by Dr. Shane, but rather during his medical treatment
of her as his patient. The legal obligations which Dr. Shane owed to
Duprey as his patient were entirely different from those which he
owed her as his employee.
1 17
The dissent concluded that because the obligations of Industrial Van-
gas as "employer" and "manufacturer" were "coequal" and "coexten-
sive," the exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation should
bar recovery at law by Bell.118 Considering the close relationship be-
tween the employment and the nature of Bell's injury, this would ap-
113. Id at 277, 637 P.2d at 272, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
114. See supra notes 53-54 & accompanying text.
115. Professor Larson has noted in his discussion of Douglas that in no sense can the
obligations of employer and manufacturer be deemed separate where tools are supplied to
employees: "[E]ven under the most permissive definition of dual capacity, the Ohio and
California cases cannot be justified. The second set of obligations, under that definition,
must be independent of the defendant's obligations as an employer. Here they are completely
intertwined. The employer has a duty as employer to provide safe scaffolding; he has a duty
as manufacturer to make safe scaffolding; if he makes unsafe scaffolding and provides it to
his employee to be used in his work, the two obligations are braided together so tightly they
cannot possibly be separated." 2A A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 72.83, at 14-245 (emphasis
added).
116. According to Industrial Vangas' declarations filed in the trial court, the "marketing
activities" were minor in the sense that they only involved the sale of used trucks. See supra
note 100.
117. 30 Cal. 3d at 285, 637 P.2d at 277, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
118. Id.
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pear to be the better result.'
1 9
In answer to the defendant Industrial Vangas' second argument,
that allowing the injured worker to recover in tort would upset the bal-
ance of the workers' compensation system, the Bell majority cited the
history of the judicial exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision. 12
0
Strictly construed, of course, the exclusive remedy language of Califor-
nia Labor Code section 3601 is difficult to avoid.1 21 However, as the
majority noted in Bell, the development of dual capacity theory is in-
dicative of California courts' refusal to apply the exclusive remedy pro-
vision where the employment relationship does not predominate. 122 In
119. Although the majority, citing Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361
N.E.2d 492 (1976), characterized Bell's injury as "only a matter of circumstance," 30 Cal. 3d
at 278, 637 P.2d at 272-73, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 37, the dissent argued that this claim was
"absurd." Id at 283, 637 P.2d at 276, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 40. The following hypothetical from
the defendant's brief illustrates that the duties owed Bell as an employee were not separate
from those owed him as a "user" of the allegedly defective products: "S, a large retail store,
sells lawnmowers to the general public. A, B, and C are all employees of S. A decides to
purchase a lawnmower from S for his personal home use; he goes to B, a store lawnmower
salesman, during regular working hours, and while B is demonstrating the lawnmower for A
it breaks, injuring both A and B. C, the store's gardener, is injured when an identical lawn-
mower furnished to him by S breaks while he is using it to mow the grass at S's store en-
trance. A, B, and C all bring actions at law against S for marketing a defective product.
"The case of A is analogous to Duprey v. Shane, and is a classic case for assertion of
dual capacity. While the injury is sustained at work, the employee A is not 'performing
service growing out of. . .his employment;. . . the employee is free to pursue a civil action
against the employer as seller of the dangerous product, just as if he had been injured while
using the same product at home ....
"The action brought by C in the hypothetical is analogous to that approved by the
Court of Appeal in Douglas v. E. & J Gallo Winery ..... .It may be arguable that in
furnishing to C the same lawnmower which it sells to the general public, S stepped outside
the bounds of the employment relationship and chose to treat C as an ordinary consumer of
its product ....
"The action brought by B in the hypothetical is exactly analogous to the cross-com-
plaint of Appellant William Bell herein against his employer Industrial Vangas, Inc.
Whether or not B actually files a claim for workers' compensation benefits, it is clear that the
employer-employee relationship as to him has never been interrupted. He stands in the
shoes of his employer as its agent for the purposes of marketing the product, and cannot now
claim the right to simultaneously occupy the shoes of a user or consumer of the very prod-
ucts which it was his own particular job to sell .. " Petition for Hearing in the California
Supreme Court by Respondent Industrial Vangas, Inc. at 15-17 (Oct. 27, 1980).
120. 30 Cal. 3d at 272-76, 637 P.2d at 269-71, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 33-35.
121. See supra note 3 for text of California Labor Code § 3601. Commentators have
noted: "[Tihe majority of the [Bell] court seemed to attach rather little importance to the
clear, unambiguous language of the California statute mandating the exclusive remedy rule
and to the overwhelming weight of authority in other jurisdictions." Birnbaum & Wrubel,
supra note 77, at 945.
122. 30 Cal. 3d at 272, 637 P.2d at 269, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 33. The Bell majority cited a
number of cases supporting its argument that the "37-year history of California legal prece-
dents" contradicted Industrial Vangas' statement of the scope of the exclusive remedy provi-
sion. The court observed that California's liberal interpretation of the exclusive remedy
provision began with the case of Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944). In
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this context, the Bell majority emphasized that employer-employee re-
lations and employee remedies have changed since the adoption of the
workers' compensation system, makiig the exclusivity arguments less
compelling in the products liability c6ntext.'
23
The Bell court sought to define the employer-manufacturer dual
capacity exception in such a way as to grant to injured workers the
products liability rights enjoyed by the general public.124 Recognition
of the public policy of deterring the manufacture and distribution of
dangerous articles is central to the Bell majority's analysis. 25 The
court also noted that products liability theory comprehends that loss to
the user should be reallocated to the enterprise which can best dis-
tribute it to society.
126
The Bell court was obviously concerned with giving injured work-
ers and injured members of the public equivalent treatment with re-
spect to suits based on defective products.127 The majority argued that
"the historic tradeoft" of workers' compensation did not encompass
products liability rights "not yet in being." The desire to expand the
rights of employees with respect to products liability actions led the
Bell court to observe:
To accept Vangas' construction and application of these statutes
would require this court to hold that employees are not entitled to
maintain a products liability action against a manufacturer in cir-
cumstances where all other users of defective products could main-
tain such an action. By interpreting the workers' compensation law
in harmony with product liability doctrine a manufacturer will not
escape liability to its employees for defective products where there
Baugh, an employee, injured within the scope of his employment while riding as a passenger
in a car driven by his employer, was allowed (under Labor Code § 3852) to pursue an action
at law against a third-party lessor of the automobile. 30 Cal. 3d at 273, 637 P.2d at 269, 179
Cal. Rptr. at 33.
123. 30 Cal. 3d at 279-80, 637 P.2d at 273, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 37: "To deny Bell such a
cause of action because he is an employee, gives the employer more protection than envi-
sioned by the 1911 Act."
124. Id at 279, 637 P.2d at 273, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 37: "The public policy goals underly-
ing product liability doctrine should not be subverted by the mere fortuitous circumstance
that the injured individual was an employee of the manufacturer whose product caused the
injury."
125. Id: "The imperative of public safety, the deterrence of the manufacture of shoddy
products, was a powerful force motivating the establishment of product liability law. The
manufacturer is held strictly liable because it 'is in a peculiarly strategic position to promote
the safety of [its] products .... [Tihe pressure of strict liability could scarcely be exerted at
a better point if accident prevention is to be furthered by tort law."' (citation omitted).
126. Id As the California Supreme Court held in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963), "The purpose of
[products] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are
borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves."
127. 30 Cal. 3d at 278, 637 P.2d at 272, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
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would be liability to any other injured person.
128
The strength of this argument, however, depends upon the degree
to which the dangerous article actually reaches the public. In the con-
text of the Bell case itself, the argument that the injured worker should
not be denied products liability rights enjoyed by the general public is
not persuasive for two reasons: first, the "products" were only sold on
an extremely limited basis; second, the use of the product was confined
to the immediate purposes of the employment.,
29
The most unsettling aspect of the Bell opinion is that, although the
court recognized the argument that a products liability dual capacity
exception would open a "Pandora's box" of employee injury cases
outside of the workers' compensation system, 130 it neglected to analyze
the effect of expanding the dual capacity doctrine upon the workers'
compensation system in California. While many employers may be
able to negate the claim that they are manufacturers of a defective item,
because of the scope of the "manufacturer" exception employers will
also have to prove they have not helped in some way to put the item
into the "stream of commerce." This may be a difficult task. 31 More-
over, there is already a significant amount of products liability litiga-
tion in the workplace brought against third-party manufacturers,
32
indicating that products liability suits against employers may become
common occurrences. 13
3
The result in Bell indicates a conflict between the administration
of the workers' compensation system and products liability theory.
128. Id
129. See supra note 100. Cf Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d
492 (1976), in which the allegedly defective item, a truck tire, was widely sold to the public
and was utilized in a personal, as well as business, context.
130. 30 Cal. 3d at 271-72, 637 P.2d at 268, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
131. See supra notes 108-16 & accompanying text.
132. "One study indicates that employer negligence is involved in something over half
of the product-caused workplace injuries. The same study also indicates that, but for work-
ers' compensation exclusivity of remedy, employers would be impleaded in two thirds of the
workplace products liability suits." PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 87 (working paper by
Professor Jerry J. Phillips). In addition, nearly half of products liability litigation is cur-
rently workplace-related. Id at 9.
133. 30 Cal. 3d at 279, 637 P.2d at 273, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 37. Although the majority
clearly regarded the situation where an employee is injured by a product "manufactured or
supplied" by his or her employer as unique, the dissent recognized the obvious danger in the
exception: "I am convinced that the majority's adoption of the Douglas rule will drive a
substantial wedge into the exclusivity principle which characterized the workers' compensa-
tion laws from their very inception. If an employer is to be held civilly liable to injured
workers in the employer's capacity as a 'manufacturer,' what compelling reason can exist for
denying similar liability for injuries attributable to the employer's other relationships in-
cluding his status as 'landowner,' 'motor vehicle operator,' or 'cafeteria proprietor'? Yet em-
ployers in our 'pluralistic society' frequently assume multiple roles in the course of their
ordinary business pursuits." Id at 287, 637 P.2d at 278, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 42 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
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This conflict arises from the tendency of courts to construe both theo-
ries liberally. Workers' compensation laws have been interpreted to
bring more worker injuries within their provisions, 34 while products
liability theory utilizes an expansive definition of "manufacturer" in
order to impute liability to all parties responsible for the distribution of
defective products.1 35 Thus, the products liability definition of "manu-
facturer" in the dual capacity context may tend to work against the
policy of the workers' compensation system of adjudicating as many
worker injury claims as possible within its jurisdiction. In a broad so-
cial sense, the policies of workers' compensation and products liability
are not necessarily antagonistic since they both have as their goal the
reallocation of the cost of injuries from the injured party to society as a
whole. 136 However, in a more immediate sense, the Bell holding sub-
stantially alters the "tradeoff" of workers' compensation by increasing
the number of suits against employers outside of workers' compensa-
tion. 137 To the extent the Bell holding is based on questionable legal
analysis,138 the result seems particularly unjustified.
Possible Alternatives to the Products Liability Exception
As an alternative to its products liability approach, the Bell court
might have established a test for dual capacity based upon the em-
ployer's undertaking significant manufacturing activities outside of the
employer-employee relationship. Under such a test, where the employ-
ment relationship predominates over the circumstances of the em-
ployer's other capacity, the exclusive remedy provision would bar suit
by an injured worker against the employer. 139 A variant of this test is
the "balancing approach," in which the policies underlying the work-
ers' compensation system are balanced against the policies supporting
134. There is a statutory presumption favoring recovery for an injured worker under the
California workers' compensation system where there is doubt as to the worker's status as an
"employee." See Laeng v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. 3d 771, 494 P.2d
1, 100 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1972); Las Flores School Dist. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 13 Cal.
App. 2d 180, 56 P.2d 581 (1936). See generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 1, § 3.01[31, at 3-5.
135. See supra notes 111-14 & accompanying text.
136. See Note, Dual Capaciy Doctrine. Third-Party Liabiliy of Employer-Manufacturer
in Products Liability Litigation, 12 IND. L. Rav. 553, 580 (1979) (reconciling the loss distribu-
tion policies of workers' compensation and products liability).
137. As Justice Richardson observed: "There can be no question but that this delicate
balance, carefully conceived and preserved for many years by the Legislature, is significantly
altered and disturbed when we hold that each of the thousands of employers in this state
engaged in manufacturing for ultimate sale to the public loses the statutory immunity to any
employee who is injured by defects in the goods or products manufactured." 30 Cal. 3d at
288-89, 637 P.2d at 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 43 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
138. See supra notes 108-19 & accompanying text.
139. Advocates of this approach would most likely disapprove of the results in Bell and
Douglas since the manufacturing activity in each case was closely related to the purpose of
the employer-employee relationship.
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liability for the employer acting in the second capacity. 40 A difficulty
with undertaking this type of case-by-case analysis of the employer-
manufacturer's dual capacity is the likelihood of unpredictable and in-
consistent recoveries for injured workers. An advantage to the Bell ap-
proach is that it provides employers and employees with some notice as
to what activities will give rise to dual capacity liability for employers.
A more drastic solution to the dual capacity problem is to elimi-
nate such suits by legislative fiat. This could be accomplished by alter-
ing the language of California Labor Code section 3601 to make it
clear that the exclusive remedy provision applies to employers acting in
any capacity at the time of injury. 14 1 A problem inherent in this ap-
proach, however, is that it does not remove the motivating factor for
injured employees to attempt to circumvent the exclusivity of workers'
compensation-the perception of workers' compensation benefits as
inadequate. 42
Another alternative regarding dual capacity is to amend the work-
ers' compensation laws to allow a more adequate recovery for workers
injured by defective products in the workplace. Such an amendment
could take the form of a statutory products liability action, allowing a
larger workers' compensation award for an employee injured by a
product manufactured by his or her employer.143 Authority for this
type of approach already exists in California in the form of Labor Code
140. Miller & Goldstein, supra note 12, at 116: "[The balancing] approach considers the
rationale of the compensation system and then decides whether the policies behind the sec-
ond relationship are, in fact, important enough to override the purposes behind the frame-
work. This approach may lead to the preservation of the primacy of workers' compensation
in providing for injuries in the workplace."
141. A bill was defeated in the California Legislature that would have changed Califor-
nia Labor Code § 3601(a) to read: "Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Sec-
tion 3600 concur, the right to recover such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this
division is, except as otherwise provided in Division 1 and this division, the exclusive rem-
edy for injury or death of an employee against the employer or against any other employee
of the employer acting within the scope of his employment, except as provided in subdivi-
sion (b). If the conditions ofcompensation concur, thefact that the employer also occupies any
other capacity prior to or at the time of injury shall not permit the employee or his or her
dependents to bring an action at lawfor damages against the employer in that capacity under
any theory oflaw." A.B. 2065, introduced by Assemblyman Nolan (April 2, 1981) (emphasis
added).
The Legislative Counsel's Digest noted that A.B. 2065 "would also state the finding of
the Legislature that the provisions of the bill do not constitute a change in, but are declaratory
oexisting law .... " (emphasis added).
142. See supra notes 38-39 & accompanying text.
143. This form of statutory amendment has also been suggested in Massachusetts, a ju-
risdiction that does not allow dual capacity recovery in the employer-manufacturer situa-
tion. See Note, Rejecting Dual Capacity Doctrine in Products Liability Litigation Against
Employer-Manufacturer, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 520, 535 (1981): "A more viable alternative
would require the employer to pay a statutory penalty to the employee for injuries resulting
from the defective manufacture of products used in the employment. Such an amendment
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section 4553, which provides for an increased recovery for an injured
employee when his or her injuries arise from the "willful" act of the
employer. 144
A statutory amendment providing for increased recovery under
the workers' compensation system for defective product injuries has the
advantage of accommodating the products liability policies of deterring
the manufacture of defective products and spreading the costs of prod-
uct injuries throughout society, and the workers' compensation policies
of predictable and efficient resolution of disputes over worker injuries.
Moreover, such an amendment would not seriously upset the balance
of worker and employer rights represented by the workers' compensa-
tion system. This course would be superior to the present uncertainty
caused by the judicial creation of exceptions to the workers' compensa-
tion system such as the dual capacity doctrine.
Conclusion
The California Supreme Court in Bell v. Industrial Vangas signifi-
cantly expanded the dual capacity doctrine to allow products liability
suits for injured workers against their employers. While the decision
supports the policies underlying products liability theory, it is funda-
mentally inconsistent with the original dual capacity test articulated in
Duprey v. Shane. In Bell, the activities of the employee which resulted
in injury were direct incidents of the employment, thus making the em-
ployer's "manufacturing" activity not really a "second" capacity at all.
The Bell opinion thus adopted a very liberal standard for employer-
manufacturer dual capacity that will result in numerous suits for
worker injuries outside of the workers' compensation system.
The dual capacity doctrine as articulated by the court in Bell cre-
ates a game of pleading in which the burden is on the employer to
negate its activity in every possible capacity in which a person or entity
can be sued under products liability theory. The California Legislature
should act to reduce the uncertainty inherent in this approach by bring-
ing products liability actions within the quid pro quo of the workers'
would provide a more adequate remedy to an injured employee and would prompt em-
ployer diligence to ensure the safety of the workplace."
144. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1982) provides:
"The amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-half where
the employee is injured by reason of the serious and willful misconduct of any of the follow-
ing: (a) The employer, or his managing representative. (b) If the employer is a partnership,
on the part of one of the partners or a managing representative or general superintendent
thereof. (c) If the employer is a corporation, on the part of an executive, managing officer,
or general superintendent thereof.
"But such increase of award shall in no event exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000);
together with costs and expenses incident to procurement of such award, not to exceed two
hundred fifty dollars ($250)."
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compensation system. By adopting a statutory products liability award
analogous to California Labor Code section 4553, the legislature can
protect the integrity of the workers' compensation system while remov-
ing some of the incentive to circumvent its exclusive remedy provision.
At the same time, important products liability policies will be
accommodated.
Glen R. Olson *
* Member, Third Year Class.
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